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Packet Filtering Assignment

Question 1. Explain how an external attacker (using port number 7000) can have accessto an internal machine (using port number 8000) based on the above rules.

Solution:

Let's say the inbound rules as Rule A and Rule B
And outbound Rules as Rule C and Rule D
• Rules A and B allow inbound SMTP connections (incoming packets).
• Rules C and D allow outbound SMTP connections (outgoing packets).
• Rule E is the default rule that applies if all else fails.
Now, let's consider some sample packets to see what happens. Let's say that our host has IP address 192.16.1.1, and that someone is trying to send me mail from the remote host with IP address 172.168.3.4. Further, let's say the sender's SMTP client uses port 1234 to talk to your SMTP server, which is on port 25.

So according to the Rules described above the packets are transferred as :

The whole scenario can be shown as

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Question 2. Explain how the attack (described in Topic 1) can be foiled by checking the Source port numbers. Please describe the enforced rule(s).

Solution:

The attack can be foiled by using the following enforced rules
• Rules A and B together do what you want to allow inbound SMTP connections.
• Rules C and D together do what you want to allow outbound SMTP connections.
In any case, Rules B and D together end up permitting all associations where the two closures are utilizing ports over 7000, and this is absolutely not what you planned.

There are likely loads of powerless servers tuning in on ports over 7000 at your site. Models are X11 (port 6000), OpenWindows (port 2000), databases (Sybase, Oracle, Informix, and different databases regularly use site-picked ports over 7000, etc. This is the reason you have to consider a standard set all in all, rather than expecting that if each standard or gathering of principles is OK, the entire set is additionally OK.

What would we be able to do about this? All things considered, imagine a scenario in which we likewise took a gander at the source port in settling on your sifting choices. Here are those equivalent five essential principles with the source port included as a standard:

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Question 3 Explain how an external attacker (using port number 80) can have access toan internal machine (using port number 8000) based on the above rules (described in Topic 2).

Solution:

As should be obvious, when the source port (8000)is likewise considered as a model, the issue parcels (numbers 5 and 6 from the above topic , speaking to an assault on one of your X11 servers) never again meet any of the guidelines for bundles to be allowed (rules A through D). The issue bundles end up being denied by the default rule.

Alright, presently imagine a scenario in which we're managing a somewhat more intelligent aggressor. Imagine a scenario where the aggressor uses port 25 as the customer port on his end (he may do this by executing off the SMTP server on a machine he controls and utilizing its port, or via doing the assault from a machine that never had a SMTP server in any case, similar to a PC), and afterward endeavors to open an association with your X11 server. Here are the bundles you'd see:

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Question 4: Explain how the above attack (described in Topic 3) can be foiled bychecking the connection initiator. Please describe the enforced rule(s).

Solution:

Enforced rules accordingly are

And to foiled the connection it can be explained as:
The main contrast in this standard set are in principles B and D. Of these, rule D is the most significant, in light of the fact that it controls approaching associations with your site. Principle B applies to associations active from your site, and destinations are commonly more keen on controlling approaching associations than active associations.

Principle D currently says to acknowledge approaching parcels from things that are as far as anyone knows SMTP servers (on the grounds that the bundles are originating from port 25) just if the bundles have the ACK bit set; that is, just if the bundles are a piece of an association began from within (from your customer to his server).

On the off chance that somebody endeavors to open a TCP association all things considered, the absolute first bundle that he sends won't have the ACK bit set; that is what's engaged with "opening a TCP association." (See the discourse of the ACK bit in the "TCP" area of "Conventions above IP" prior in this section.) If you obstruct that absolute first parcel (bundle 7 in the precedent above), you hinder the entire TCP association. Without certain data in the headers of the main parcel - specifically, the TCP grouping numbers - the association can't be set up.

For what reason can't an assailant get around this by basically setting the ACK bit on the principal bundle? In the event that the attacker does, the bundle will move beyond the channels, yet the goal will trust the parcel has a place with a current association (rather than the one with which the parcel is attempting to set up another association). At the point when the goal endeavors to coordinate the parcel with the alleged existing association, it will fall flat on the grounds that there isn't one, and the bundle will be overlooked.

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